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ABSTRACT: Vaidya has recently argued that while Husserl’s method for acquiring 
knowledge of essence through use of our imagination is subject to a vicious epistemic 
circle, we can still use the method to successfully attain objectual understanding of 
essence. In this paper, I argue that the Husserlian objectual understanding-based 
epistemology envisaged by Vaidya suffers from a similar epistemic circularity as its 
knowledge-based foil. I argue that there is a straight-forward solution to this problem, 
but then raise three serious problems for an amended version of Vaidya’s proposal and 
any similar Husserlian epistemology of essence. The paper closes with some general 
reflections on applying the Husserlian method to the contemporary notion of essence and 
on the idea of refocusing the epistemology of essence on understanding instead of 
knowledge. 
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1. Essence and the Husserlian Approach to the Epistemology of Essence 
The notion of essence has recently seen a renaissance in philosophy. Essentialism 
has first come to prominence again in the context of the discussion about 
metaphysical modality which followed important advances in quantified modal 
logic in the 1970s and 1980s. The standard view emerging from the early debate 
simply identifies essentiality and metaphysical necessity, so that the essential 
properties of an object are just those for which it is metaphysically necessary that 
the object has them, if it exists.1 More recently, philosophers such as Fine, Correia, 
                                                        
1 See e.g. Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 
Penelope Mackie, How Things Might Have Been (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), David 
Wiggins, “The De Re ‘Must’: a Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims,” in Truth and 
Meaning, eds. Gareth Evans and John McDowell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 285–
312. 
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and Lowe2 have embraced the notion of essentiality, but rejected the idea that it is 
identical or even definable in terms of metaphysical necessity. This development 
immediately raises questions about the epistemology of essence. While there are 
several well-developed approaches to the epistemology of metaphysical modality, 
such as the conceivability-based approach,3 it is not clear in how far we can depend 
on these approaches in order to explain knowledge of essence once we have 
distinguished this notion from that of metaphysical necessity. The epistemology of 
essence still offers many avenues for research.4 
A historically important approach to the epistemology of essence which was 
specifically developed with this notion rather than the notion of metaphysical 
necessity in mind, is due to Husserl. It is the method of eidetic seeing or essential 
seeing (‘Wesenserschauung’). Husserl’s main idea is that knowledge of essence can 
be gained through a specific kind of intuition, the mentioned eidetic seeing, which 
we arrive at by starting from what Husserl calls ‘intuition of something 
individual,’5 which is an experience of a particular object. At the core of the 
method is a process he calls free variation. Roughly, this process is supposed to 
                                                        
2 See Kit Fine, “Essence and Modality,” Philosophical Perspectives 8 (1994): 1–16, Kit Fine, 
“Senses of Essence,” in Modality, Morality, and Belief. Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus, 
ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995): 53–73, Fabrice 
Correia, “Generic Essence, Objectual Essence, and Modality,” Noûs 40, 4 (2006): 753–67, Fabrice 
Correia, “On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 84, 3 (2012): 639–53, and E. J. Lowe, “Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence,” Royal 
Institute of Philosophy Supplements 62 (2008): 23–48. 
3 See e.g. Stephen Yablo, “Is conceivability a guide to possibility?” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 53, 1 (1993): 1–42, David J. Chalmers, “Does Conceivability Entail 
Possibility?” in Conceivability and Possibility, eds. Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 145–200. For an overview of this and other approaches, 
see Anand Vaidya, “The Epistemology of Modality,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. Edward N. Zalta (The Metaphysics Research Lab. CSLI Stanford, 2017). 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/modality-epistemology/. 
4 Contemporary works in the epistemology of essence include Bob Hale, Necessary Beings: An 
Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the Relations Between Them (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), ch. 11 and Tuomas Tahko. “The Epistemology of Essence,” in Ontology, Modality, 
Mind: Themes from the Metaphysics of E. J. Lowe, eds. Alexander Carruth and S. C. Gibb and 
John Heil (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 93–110, Tuomas E. Tahko, “Empirically-Informed 
Modal Rationalism,” in Modal Epistemology After Rationalism, eds. Robert William Fischer and 
Felipe Leon (Cham: Synthese Library, 2017): 29–45, which build on E. J. Lowe, “What is the 
Source of Our Knowledge of Modal Truths?” Mind 121, 484 (2012): 919–950. 
5 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy. First book. General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1983): 8. Original German term: ‘individuelle Anschauung.’ 
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work as follows.6 First, we have an individual intuition of something which we 
then take as an example based on which we produce variations of it through our 
imagination. These variations have to fulfil two conditions. First, they have to be 
‘free,’ in the sense that they may randomly deviate from the original experience or 
intuition, as long as they are still ‘concretely similar’7 to it. Second, the number and 
sequence of variations also needs to be arbitrary, the idea being that it should not 
matter whether the process of imagining variations is aborted at a particular point 
or whether it could, at least theoretically, be extended infinitely.8 The purpose of 
the process is to isolate that which is invariant through all variations. This 
‘invariable what’9 is then the essence of the experienced or imagined kind of 
object, that “without which the object cannot be intuitively imagined as such.”10 
There is of course much more to be said about this method considered in its 
historical context and in relation to Husserl’s own conception of essence.11 The 
focus of this paper however is not on exegetical questions, but rather on a different 
question which we might put as follows: Can a variant of Husserl’s method of 
essential seeing serve as the basis of an epistemology of essence, assuming the 
contemporary understanding of the latter notion developed by Fine, Correia, 
Lowe, and others? This question has been taken up in a recent paper by Vaidya.12 
My main aim in this paper is to assess (and ultimately criticise) Vaidya’s answer to 
a particular variant of the question which focuses on understanding instead of 
knowledge as its epistemological target notion. 
Vaidya answers the question in the negative for the standard, knowledge-
based approach to the epistemology of essence. In this paper, I will take a 
condensed presentation of Vaidya’s argument for this conclusion as my starting 
point (section 2). In addition to this negative conclusion, Vaidya argues that our 
                                                        
6 Husserl describes the process in detail in § 87 “The method of essential seeing” in Edmund 
Husserl, Experience and Judgment. Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic, ed. Ludwig Landgrebe 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973): 340–348. See also section II of Daniele De Santis, 
“Phenomenological Kaleidoscope: Remarks on the Husserlian Method of Eidetic Variation,” in 
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy XI, eds. Burt 
Hopkins and John Drummond (London: Routledge, 2011): 20–23. 
7 Husserl, Experience and Judgment, 341.  
8 Husserl, Experience and Judgment, 342. 
9 Husserl, Experience and Judgment, 341.  
10 Ibid. 
11 See in particular Husserl’s unpublished notes on eidetic variation from his Nachlass collected 
in Edmund Husserl, Zur Lehre vom Wesen und zur Methode der eidetischen Variation. Texte 
aus dem Nachlass (1891–1935). Husserliana Vol. XLI (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012). 
12 Anand Jayprakash Vaidya. “Understanding and Essence,” Philosophia 38, 4 (2010): 811–33. 
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main question can be answered positively, if we refocus the epistemology of 
modality on a different state, namely that of understanding. This second, positive 
argument from Vaidya’s paper is presented in section 3, but then criticized in 
section 4. My main criticism will be that his positive proposal falls victim to an 
epistemic circularity very similar to the one which Vaidya identified in his critique 
of the knowledge-based variant of a Husserlian epistemology of essence. I will 
consider a response to this criticism and then present three arguments against the 
resulting approach and similar Husserlian approaches in section 5. In section 6, I 
close with a discussion of the prospects for other applications of Husserl’s method 
in the contemporary epistemology of essence and for Vaidya’s idea of refocusing 
the debate on understanding instead of knowledge. 
2. Vaidya’s Negative Argument 
Vaidya argues that Husserl’s method of free variation, which he calls Variation-in-
Imagination, ‘VIM’ for short, cannot produce knowledge of essence.13 Vaidya’s 
argument for the latter claim is based on three necessary conditions for attaining 
knowledge of essence. The first is Necessity-of-object-preservation, NOP:  
NOP In order for an imaginative process, such as VIM, to yield a judgment about 
whether P is an essential property of o through property variation on o via the 
construction of a set of scenarios S1...Sn, it must be the case that o is preserved in 
the transition from each Si to Sk.14 
In other words, for VIM to successfully produce in us knowledge of the 
essence of o, the scenarios, or in Husserl’s term, variations, which we run through, 
                                                        
13 See Vaidya, “Understanding and Essence,” 820. 
14 Vaidya, “Understanding and Essence,” 821. Note that in accepting this condition as a constraint 
on VIM, Vaidya departs from Husserl, who insists that “variation [in imagination] depends 
precisely on this: that we drop the identity of the individual and change it imaginatively into 
another possible individual” (Husserl, Experience and Jusgment, 347–8). That Husserl’s notion of 
essence admits of no essential truths (in the sense of eidetic law statements) about particular 
individuals is also explained in Rochus Sowa, “Essences and Eidetic Laws in Edmund Husserl’s 
Descriptive Eidetics,” The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 
VII, eds. Burt Hopkins and Steven Crowell (London: Routledge, 2007): 77–108. Note however 
that Vaidya’s acceptance of NOP matches the predominant focus on individual essence which 
one e.g. finds in earlier contributions to the contemporary discussion of essence, such as Fine, 
“Essence and Modality” and Fine, “Senses of Essence.” Later works broadened the focus by 
including a notion of generic essence (see e.g. Fabrice Correia, “Generic Essence, Objectual 
Essence, and Modality,” Noûs 40, 4 (2006): 753–67, Kit Fine, “Unified Foundations for Essence 
and Ground,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1, 2 (2015): 296–311), which is 
however also distinct from Husserl’s notion. 
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have to be such that the object o stays the same. It is only the properties of the 
object which may be varied when passing from one such scenario to another; the 
object itself cannot be. 
The second necessary condition for attaining knowledge of essence through 
VIM is: 
NAC If a VIM yields knowledge of the essence of o for a subject A, then it cannot 
be the case that the preservation of o across S1...Sn is accidental.15 
That the objects o is preserved through S1...Sn just means that o has to be the 
same object throughout S1...Sn. In other words, NAC tells us that for an instance of 
VIM to yield knowledge of essence, it has to non-accidentally confirm to NOP. 
This second assumption is modelled on a general assumption about knowledge 
which is defended by several contemporary epistemologists, namely that it is not 
merely a matter of (a problematic kind of) epistemic luck that the subject has 
gained the relevant true belief.16 The idea captured by NAC is accordingly that for 
an instance of VIM to succeed, NOP has to be non-accidentally satisfied. 
The third and last necessary condition is: 
CCC In order for a subject to construct a scenario Si involving an object o, the 
subject must consciously choose which properties o is to have from a set of 
properties Π, which the subject has knowledge of.17 
CCC’s role in the argument is to make clear that it is the subject involved in 
VIM who actively chooses which properties to vary when passing from one 
scenario to the next. 
Briefly stated, the problem Vaidya raises for the Husserlian approach with 
respect to these three conditions is the following: For VIM to reliably yield 
knowledge of essence, the subject applying the method must consider only 
variations which involve o (by NOP). It furthermore needs to be the case that the 
relevant true belief generated by VIM is not brought about accidentally, i.e. in a 
manner conducive to an inadmissible case of epistemic luck (by NAC). The 
problem with the process then arises since the preservation of o across the relevant 
scenarios is a matter of the preservation of o’s essential properties. Since it is the 
subject involved in VIM which has to actively choose which properties to vary 
when imagining a new scenario (by CCC), what is needed to preclude the sort of 
                                                        
15 Vaidya, “Understanding and Essence,” 822. 
16 See e.g. Peter Unger, “An Analysis of Factual Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy 65, 6 (1968): 
157–170, Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). The notion 
will be discussed in a bit more detail later in the paper. 
17 Vaidya, “Understanding and Essence,” 822. 
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accidentiality which is ruled out by NAC is a guarantee that the subject will vary 
only o’s accidental properties when going through an instance of VIM, leaving its 
essential properties unchanged. 
Vaidya’s point is that such a guarantee could only be given if the subject 
knew beforehand which properties these were. We can try to make this more 
precise by spelling out the non-accidentiality requirement imposed by NAC in 
terms of a set of relevant possible worlds: For NAC to be satisfied, it has to be the 
case that in every relevant possible world in which the subject creates a scenario, 
the scenario is created by subtracting a non-essential property of o, resulting in a 
scenario centred on o and not on some distinct object o’ which differs from o in its 
essential properties. Since according to CCC, the subject creates the scenario by 
conscious choice, this choice must be backed by a belief that the subtracted 
property is non-essential to o. Assuming that this backing-belief is present in all 
relevant relevant possible worlds, it follows that this belief of the subject satisfies a 
modal anti-luck luck condition for knowledge. While this does not logically entail 
that the subject knows that the relevant property is non-essential to o, anti-luck 
conditions are after all necessary, not sufficient for knowledge, we can, due to a 
lack of plausible alternative explanations, abductively infer that the subject has to 
have this piece of knowledge about o’s essence. Granting this inference, we can 
conclude that the subject has to have knowledge of the essence of o in order to 
gain knowledge of the essence of o via VIM, resulting in a vicious epistemic 
circle.18 The, in my opinion correct, conclusion of the negative part of Vaidya’s 
argument is that Husserl’s method of free variation is not a suitable means to gain 
knowledge of essence. 
 
 
 
                                                        
18 See Vaidya, “Understanding and Essence,” 823 for a more detailed presentation of the 
argument. Note that similar points have been raised by many others authors, including e.g. Peter 
H. Spader, “Phenomenology and the Claiming of Essential Knowledge,” Husserl Studies 11, 3 
(1994): 179 and Peter Simons, “Experience and Judgment: Investigations in A Genealogy of 
Logic, by Edmund Husserl,” Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology 7, 1 (1976): 61–65. 
A range of similar objections is also critically discussed in David Kasmier, “A Defense of Husserl’s 
Method of Free Variation,” in Epistemology, Archaeology, Ethics. Current Investigations of 
Husserl’s Corpus, eds. Pol Vandevelde and Sebastian Luft (London: Continuum, 2010): 21–40. 
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3. Vaidya’s Positive Proposal: VIM as a Means to Gain Objectual Understanding of 
Essence 
3.1 Objectual Understanding of Essence 
Vaidya argues that VIM still has a use in the epistemology of essence: It may not 
deliver knowledge, but it can instead be used to attain objectual understanding of 
essences. Some epistemologists have argued that understanding (including both its 
objectual and other varieties) is at least as important a subject of epistemological 
investigation as is knowledge.19 Vaidya’s positive proposal hence promises to give 
us a new epistemic foundation for the epistemology of essence and potentially also 
the epistemology of modality more generally.20 
There is no universal agreement about what understanding is in the 
contemporary literature. Among the accounts on offer, Vaidya in particular relies 
on Kvanvig’s. Crucially, this account is based on the idea that ‘understanding is not 
a species of knowledge.’21 According to Kvanvig’s account, understanding does 
however share, with an important qualification which will be discussed shortly, an 
important property of knowledge, namely its factivity. There is a near consensus 
that knowledge is factive, i.e. that for every p, if someone knows that p, then p.22 
While the consensus about the factivity of understanding, i.e. about whether the 
beliefs which an epistemic agent holds when understanding a subject have to be 
true, is not as strong as in case of knowledge, that some form of factivity holds is 
still the standard view.23 Kvanvig in particular points out that while 
‘understanding’ is sometimes used non-factively in order to hedge claims which 
appear too strong, as e.g. in “My understanding is that you weren’t home till after 
midnight,” he still holds that the notion of understanding which is of interest to 
epistemologists is factive.24 
Kvanvig accepts that propositional understanding, i.e. the sort of 
understanding at issue e.g. in “Claude understands that his internet connection is 
                                                        
19 See Stephen R. Grimm, “The Value of Understanding,” Philosophy Compass 7, 2 (2012): 103–
117. 
20 See Vaidya, “Understanding and Essence,” 310–312. 
21 Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 196. 
22 See however Allan Hazlett, “The Myth of Factive Verbs,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 80, 3 (2010): 497–522. 
23 Some non-factive cases of understanding are e.g. admitted in Linda Zagzebski, “Recovering 
Understanding,” Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, 
and Virtue, ed. Matthias Steup (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
24 See Kvanvig, Value of Knowledge, 191. 
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slow,” is factive. However, he explicitly relaxes this requirement with respect to 
objectual understanding, understanding of a more complex subject matter, e.g. as 
in “Claude understands quantum mechanics.”: If someone has some false beliefs 
about a subject matter, then “we can ascribe understanding based on the rest of the 
information grasped that is true and contains no falsehoods,”25 as long as these 
“false beliefs concern matters that are peripheral rather than central to the subject 
matter in question.”26 Since factivity will play a crucial role in the argument of the 
next section, I will come back to this point. 
Besides the similarity concerning factivity, there are two crucial differences 
between understanding and knowledge according to Kvanvig’s account. First, 
“understanding requires, and knowledge does not, an internal grasping or 
appreciation of how the various elements in a body of information are related to 
each other in terms of explanatory, logical, probabilistic, and other kinds of 
relations that coherentists have thought constitutive of justification.”27 To illustrate 
this, consider Zeno, who has absolutely no idea about quantum mechanics, but has 
adopted a large set of true beliefs about the theory, including e.g. that the 
development over time of a quantum system is governed by Schrödinger’s 
equation, because his physicist friend told him. Zeno can correctly be described as 
knowing the corresponding facts about quantum mechanics, even though it is clear 
that he completely lacks the grasping of the intrinsic structure of quantum 
mechanics which would be required for him to understand quantum mechanics. 
Second, unlike knowledge, understanding is compatible with epistemic 
luck.28 Imagine for example that most books about politics were factually 
inaccurate, safe for the one excellent book which Xenia picked up randomly to 
learn about politics. The true beliefs about politics which Xenia acquires by reading 
the book would not constitute knowledge, since they are a product of epistemic 
luck. Her beliefs are, so to say, not modally stable enough to qualify as knowledge: 
She was very lucky to have picked the one factually accurate book and could easily 
have picked one of the many factually inaccurate ones instead. However, in the 
same scenario, Xenia could still acquire objectual understanding of politics. The 
presence of epistemic luck would not diminish Xenia’s cognitive achievement of 
having developed an understanding of politics which manifests itself through her 
true beliefs about this subject matter. 
                                                        
25 Kvanvig, Value of Knowledge, 201. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Kvanvig, Value of Knowledge, 192–3. 
28 See Kvanvig, Value of Knowledge, 199. 
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3.2 Vaidya’s Objectual Understanding-Based Proposal 
It is the second difference to knowledge which holds the key to Vaidya’s positive 
proposal, i.e. its compatibility with epistemic luck. Vaidya’s idea is to drop both 
NAC and NOP as necessary conditions on the success of VIM in order to repurpose 
it as a method for gaining objectual understanding of essence. Dropping NAC 
ensures that the epistemic circularity which affects the method in the knowledge-
case no longer arises: The requirement of a guarantee that NOP is non-
contingently satisfied drops out, which means that we no longer need to assume 
that a subject has to already have knowledge of the relevant essence. 
If the epistemic circularity is already taken care of, why also drop NOP? 
Vaidya gives two reasons: First, the objectual understanding-based version of VIM 
may involve scenarios not centred on the object whose essence the subject aims to 
discover. According to Vaidya, such scenarios can contribute to the success of VIM 
since they allow the subject to “see how changing a property destroys the object” 
and “to comprehend why the property in question is essential.”29 
Second, Vaidya argues that NOP is an aboutness condition, which means 
that it ensures that VIM produces objectual understanding of the essence of the 
right object. This makes NOP an implicit second anti-luck condition, since it 
ensures that the true beliefs which a subject gains through VIM about o’s essence 
are not merely by accident about that object, rather than another one.30 
This second argument for rejecting NOP is, to my mind, unconvincing. NAC 
basically says that NOP has to be satisfied non-contingently, so if NOP itself 
already has a non-contingency condition built in, why doesn’t this render NAC 
redundant? I will not go deeper into this question here for the simple reason that 
the argument of the next section will settle the status of NOP within Vaidya’s 
proposal. 
With the epistemic circularity taken care of, the following picture emerges: 
VIM is a method for acquiring objectual understanding of essence. Objectual 
understanding of essence is a state which i) involves true beliefs about essence, as it 
is factive, ii) is not subject to a version of NAC, as it is compatible with epistemic 
luck in acquiring these true beliefs, and iii) consists in a cognitively internal 
grasping of certain relations holding between different aspects of the essence of the 
object.31 Having described Vaidya’s positive proposal for an epistemology of 
essence, I will now criticize it. 
                                                        
29 Vaidya, “Understanding and Essence,” 824. 
30 See Vaidya, “Understanding and Essence,” 826. 
31 There are several questions about this proposal which one may ask. It does for example not 
address the metaphysical question of what the object of understanding is when one objectually 
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4. Another Epistemic Circularity 
Vaidya’s positive proposal includes the idea that scenarios which violate NOP can, 
and do, play a role in instances of VIM which lead to the acquisition of objectual 
understanding of essence. Here is how Vaidya explains their contribution:  
Any scenario that does not contain o is a scenario that plays a role in the subject 
arriving at an objectual understanding of the essence of o. In a scenario where 
some o* [i.e. an object distinct from o] is present the subject can see how changing 
a property destroys the object. This accidental insight into the object being 
changed allows the subject to comprehend why the property in question is 
essential.32 
The general idea captured by this quote is that NOP-violating scenarios can 
contribute to one’s gaining objectual understanding of essence by allowing one to 
see under which conditions the relevant object ceases to be itself. My focus for 
now will be on instances of VIM which involve such scenarios.  
It is clear from Vaidya’s negative argument that in a scenario of this sort, the 
subject would have to subtract one of the object o’s essential properties. If it tried 
for example to gain objectual understanding of Socrates’s essence, it might, let us 
assume, do this by subtracting his property of being human. With this kept in 
mind, let us come back to Vaidya’s claim that a NOP-violating scenario can 
contribute to the success of an instance of VIM by allowing the subject to see that 
o has ceased to be itself. For the point I am about to make it is important that 
objectual understanding is factive with respect to the relevant beliefs, i.e. in this 
case the belief that Socrates is essentially human. As I have pointed out in the 
previous section, Kvanvig’s account of objectual understanding allows for someone 
to objectually understand a subject matter, even if they have some false beliefs 
about it, as long as these false beliefs concern only matters peripheral to the 
subject. Since the following argument requires factivity, I will now discuss to 
which extent this assumption can be made in the case of objectual understanding 
of essence, focusing in particular on whether Kvanvig’s exception for peripheral 
beliefs applies in this context. 
                                                                                                                      
understands an essence. Kvanvig and others often talk of a subject or subject matter as the object 
of objectual understanding (see e.g. Kvanvig, Value of Knowledge, 197). This view for instance 
does not seem to square well with the traditional characterization of an object’s essence in terms 
of its essential properties since it is unclear what the subject matter could be in this case. Further 
questions arise e.g. about the relation between the notion of judgment Vaidya relies on and those 
of belief and knowledge. 
32 Vaidya, “Understanding and Essence,” 824. 
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Granting Kvanvig’s exception, which peripheral matters could a subject have 
false beliefs about without thereby undermining that it objectually understands an 
entity’s essence? Since the essence of a subject matter concerns just those of its 
features which it has to have for it to be that subject matter,33 it is hard to see 
which beliefs about an entity’s essence could count as peripheral, rather than 
central to it. It seems that the only plausible way to classify some beliefs about an 
entity’s essence as peripheral is to accept Fine’s distinctions between 
constitutive/consequential essence (intuitively, those parts of an entity’s essence 
which are directly definitive of it/those parts which aren’t, but rather are had 
essentially in virtue of other parts of its essence) and immediate/mediate essence 
(intuitively, the mediate essence of an entity also contains the essences of all 
entities on which it ontologically depends, whereas its immediate essence doesn’t) 
and to identify the peripheral part of its essence with the union of its consequential 
and mediate parts.34 According to this way of drawing the distinction, at least the 
intersection of the immediate and constitutive parts of an entity’s essence are 
central in Kvanvig’s sense, which means that a subject must have true beliefs about 
them in order to objectively understand the entity’s essence. Accordingly, 
understanding of immediate constitutive essence is indeed factive. In the 
following, my focus will first be exclusively on such beliefs, i.e. on beliefs about 
the immediate constitutive essence of entities. I will argue that an epistemic 
circularity similar to the one exploited by Vaidya in his negative argument will 
prevent subjects from acquiring understanding of immediate constitutive essence. 
After making this point, I will argue that this conclusion generalizes to essence in 
general. For the sake of simplicity, I will use ‘essence’ as a synonym for ‘immediate 
constitutive essence’ throughout the rest of this section, unless explicitly specified 
otherwise. 
                                                        
33 As per Aristotle’s original characterization of essence as the ‘what it is to be’. See his 
Metaphysics Z.4 and all contemporary accounts departing from it, including Fine’s, Correia’s, 
and Lowe’s. 
34 See Fine, “Senses of Essence,” sections 3 and 5 for the distinctions and see Kathrin Koslicki, 
“Varieties of Ontological Dependence,” Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of 
Reality, eds. Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schnieder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 190–195, Eileen S. Nutting and Ben Caplan and Chris Tillman, “Constitutive Essence and 
Partial Grounding,” Inquiry 61, 2 (2018): 137–161, and Justin Zylstra, “Constitutive and 
Consequentialist Essence,” Thought 8, 3 (2019): 190–199 for discussions of the first of the two 
distinctions. Note that this identification requires that the consequential parts of the relevant 
essence are merely consequential, i.e. not also constitutive and that it may be inadmissible for 
entities whose constitutive essence is essentially inferential, such as e.g. logical concepts like 
conjunction. 
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Let us for the sake of simplicity assume that a subject is going through an 
instance of VIM involving only one NOP-violating scenario, a scenario in which 
Socrates is not human and let us furthermore assume that it is part of Socrates’s 
essence that he is human. The crucial point concerning this scenario for which I 
am going to argue now is that since only true beliefs about the essence of Socrates 
can constitute objectual understanding, the subject would have to recognize that 
this scenario does not involve Socrates in order to arrive at a (true) belief which 
can constitute understanding of Socrates’s essence. 
To see this point consider what would happen if it did not. In that case, 
some scenario or some scenarios produced by a subject going through VIM would 
not involve Socrates, but instead a non-human who resembles him in other 
respects. Now given the following success condition on VIM formulated by 
Husserl, it would follow that the subject acquires a false belief about Socrates’s 
essence: To gain an insight into the essence of an object via an instance of VIM, the 
subject needs to grasp, as Husserl writes, the multiplicity of all the scenarios it has 
produced. Only by doing that can the subject isolate those features which stay 
constant throughout all imagined variations of the object and so ultimately gain 
insight into the object’s essence.35 The condition requires the subject to grasp all 
the scenarios which of course includes any scenario(s) involving the non-human 
Socrates-like creature. The presence of at least one such scenario would therefore 
produce a false belief about the essence of Socrates in the subject. To generalize 
from the example, any instance of VIM which involves a NOP-violating scenario 
will produce a false belief in the subject. 
Since objectual understanding of essence is factive, a subject cannot acquire 
objectual understanding of an object’s essence via an instance of VIM if that 
instance involves at least one NOP-violating scenario. Based on this point, we can, 
just as in Vadiya’s negative argument, abductively infer that a subject would have 
to recognize the NOP-violating scenarios involved in an instance of VIM as being 
such in order to avoid acquiring a false belief about the essence of an entity to 
finally gain understanding of it. The justification for this abductive inference, just 
as in Vaidya’s argument, is that there is no other plausible explanation for what 
could enable a subject to successfully apply VIM to acquire understanding of the 
essence of an entity. 
                                                        
35 As Husserl puts it, “[o]nly if we retain in grasp the things imagined earlier, as a multiplicity in 
an open process, and only if we look toward the congruent and the purely identical, do we attain 
the eidos [i.e. the ideal form which constitutes the essence]” (Husserl, Experience and 
Judgment,”  343). 
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So we face an epistemic circularity again: Only a subject which already has 
knowledge of the essence of the relevant object, or at least holds true beliefs about 
the essence of the relevant object as part of its understanding of that essence, can 
recognize that it has produced a NOP-violating scenario. Without this recognition 
on the side of the subject, the relevant instance of VIM will lead it to acquire false 
beliefs about the essence of the relevant object, leading to a violation of the 
factivity requirement. Hence, the subject could only successfully gain 
understanding of the essence of an object via a NOP-violating instance of VIM, if it 
already had the true beliefs it is supposed to acquire to gain this understanding. 
This shows that pace Vaidya, NOP-violating scenarios cannot contribute to the 
success of applications of VIM. 
Now let us lift the restriction to immediate constitutive essence which was 
upheld throughout the preceding paragraphs. If NOP-violating instances of VIM 
do not allow a subject to acquire objectual understanding of immediate constitutive 
essence, what does this tell us about objectual understanding of essence in general? 
Recall that according to Kvanvig, someone can objectually understand a subject 
even though they hold false beliefs about the subject, as long as those false beliefs 
concern only peripheral matters, but not matters central to the subject.36 Given the 
plausible assumption that the matters which are central to an entity’s essence are 
the immediate constitutive parts of its essence, this entails that a subject cannot 
objectually understand an entity’s essence at all if it holds false beliefs about that 
essence’s immediate constitutive parts. So for a subject to gain any sort of objectual 
understanding of essence, it has to have only true beliefs about the constitutive 
immediate parts of this essence. Since I have just (abductively) argued that subjects 
cannot plausibly satisfy this condition in the context of a NOP-violating instance of 
VIM, the conclusion that instances of VIM which involve NOP-violating scenarios 
do not allow them to acquire objectual understanding of essence generalizes to 
essence tout court, i.e. the broader notion of essence which also includes 
consequential and mediate essence. 
An immediate consequence of the conclusion of the preceding argument is 
that a subject can only successfully acquire objectual understanding of an object’s 
essence via an instance of VIM, if this instance involves no NOP-violating 
scenarios. But this just means that, pace Vaidya, NOP has to be part of the positive 
proposal. Does re-introducing this principle finally give us a workable 
understanding-based epistemology of essence? 
 
                                                        
36 See again Kvanvig, Value of Knowledge, 201. 
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5. Can Vaidya’s Proposal be Fixed By Re-Introducing NOP? 
Can one simply reintroduce NOP as a component of Vaidya’s proposal? If Vaidya is 
right to think of NOP as an anti-luck condition, then one cannot consistently do 
so: Objectual understanding is by definition compatible with epistemic luck, so an 
epistemology of essence centred on this notion cannot involve an anti-luck 
condition. There are two ways around this problem: Pace Vaidya, one might just 
deny that NOP is an anti-luck condition. This would immediately dissolve the 
problem and NOP could consistently be retained as a condition on the success of 
VIM. 
Second, even if one granted Vaidya’s claim about his version of NOP, one 
might avoid the problem by re-introducing a de-modalizing version of the 
principle which eliminates the modal auxiliary verb ‘must:’ 
NOP* An instance of VIM only yields a judgment about whether P is an essential 
property of o through property variation on o via the construction of a set of 
scenarios S1...Sn, if it is the case that o is preserved in the transition from each Si to 
Sk. 
Since NOP* is a non-modal principle, assuming that the conditional involved 
is the material conditional, it cannot be considered an anti-luck condition, neither 
in the sense of a safety, nor in that of a sensitivity condition.37 Still, it can block the 
circularity problem arising from NOP-violating scenarios. Just like NOP, NOP* 
makes the preservation of o throughout all scenarios involved in an instance of 
VIM a necessary condition for its success. The new principle could therefore still 
do its job and it could furthermore consistently be added as a success condition on 
Vaidya’s version of VIM. 
Re-introducing NOP or NOP* indeed saves Vaidya’s proposal from the 
problem raised in the previous section. But does this addition result in a workable 
variant of Vaidya’s proposal? There are three important reasons to doubt this. 
 
                                                        
37 Anti-luck conditions in epistemology are usually spelled out in terms of a range of closest 
possible worlds and are therefore essentially modal: Safety conditions require that for a subject to 
know that p, p has to be true in the closest worlds in which it is believed (see e.g. Ernest Sosa, 
“How to Defeat Opposition to Moore,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 137–49, Pritchard, 
Epistemic Luck, ch. 6, Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), chs. 4–5, sensitivity conditions in contrast require that p is not believed 
by the subject in the closest non-p worlds (see e.g. Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1981): ch. 3. 
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5.1 VIM’s Quality as a Method for Acquiring Objectual Understanding of Essence 
It is clear that Husserl considers VIM to be a method. To be more specific, a 
method “for the acquisition of pure concepts or concepts of essences.”38 
Surprisingly, Vaidya never refer to VIM as a method in his “Understanding and 
Essence.” Yet, he never explicitly denies that it is one either. Since it is very hard 
to see what else VIM could be, I will follow Husserl in assuming that VIM is a 
method. 
The question which I will discuss in this subsection is whether VIM is a 
good method, a method which a subject seeking to acquire objectual understanding 
of essence could rationally adopt to pursue this goal. There are many different 
criteria for the overall quality of an epistemological method. I will here focus on 
two important quality criteria: First, the method’s rate of success and second, what 
I will call its transparency. I call a method transparent, if it affords the subject who 
applies it feedback on whether it can terminate with success during different stages 
of its application. The main point of this subsection will be that VIM fares badly 
with respect to both of these criteria. My argument for this point will rely on a 
systematic connection between the two criteria. 
Let me start with VIM’s transparency. A point made in the previous section 
was that a subject going through an instance of VIM cannot recognize a NOP-
violating scenario as such. To do so, it would have to be able to recognize this 
scenario as resulting from the subtraction of an essential property of the object, 
because this is the only plausible way to guarantee that an application of VIM 
involving such a scenario could succeed. This, the subject cannot do, because this 
would require it to already have the sort of robust epistemic access to the essence 
of the relevant object which it is seeking to acquire by applying VIM. This point 
can be generalized to NOP-conform scenarios: In order to recognize a scenario as 
such, the subject would have to recognize that the property which it subtracted to 
create the scenario was not an essential property of the relevant object. This would 
also require the subject to already have prior epistemic access to the relevant 
object’s essence which, by hypothesis, it does not have. So a subject who relies on 
VIM to acquire objectual understanding of essence can, on pain of epistemic 
circularity, neither recognize the scenarios which it creates while going through 
this process as NOP-violating, nor as NOP-conform. 
NOP spells out a success-condition for VIM, a condition which has to be met 
for an instance of VIM to succeed. Since a subject cannot recognize of any scenario 
whether it conforms or fails to conform to this success condition, a subject 
                                                        
38. Husserl, Experience and Judgment, 340. 
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applying the method cannot, at any stage of the process, tell whether its 
application of VIM meets this success-condition. 
This generalizes an important point about the nature of Vaidya’s proposal, 
which he explicitly mentions: Even if a subject manages to acquire objectual 
understanding of an object’s essence through VIM, this epistemic state does not 
involve the subject’s recognition that it has in fact attained this state. This follows 
directly from the account of objectual understanding which Vaidya accepts.39 The 
point just made shows that this lack of recognition not only affects a subject after it 
has successfully applied VIM, but rather it completely pervades any instance of 
VIM at all of its stages, from the very first scenario on. We can conclude that VIM 
is lacking in transparency and fares badly with respect to this first quality-
criterion. 
Let me now focus on VIM’s rate of success. Concerning this factor, I have a 
speculative argument to offer. Consider the class of all instances of VIM. Can we 
say anything about how many of these instances may succeed? To be sure, we 
cannot give a precise answer since we can neither determine the total number, nor 
the number of the successful instances of VIM. There are however two things we 
know: First, only NOP-/NOP*-conform instances can succeed, and second, VIM is 
intransparent in that a subject going through an instance of the process cannot, at 
any stage, tell whether it conforms to NOP. These two point taken together with a 
third strongly suggest that VIM does not have a good rate of success. The third 
point is that following Husserl, VIM is designed to have “a structure of 
arbitrariness,”40 which means that the process of producing scenarios in an instance 
of VIM, or to use Husserl’s terminology, variants in an application of the method of 
essential seeing, is such that “it is a matter of indifference what might still be 
joined to it, a matter of indifference what, in addition, I might be given to 
apprehend in the consciousness that ‘I could continue in this way.’”41 The 
underlying idea is of course that an object’s essence will stay the same throughout 
all possible scenarios, no matter how arbitrary the changes are which the subject 
makes to produce them. 
If we put this third point and the first two together, we get that VIM is a 
process which is very likely to fail: The process is designed to allow the subject to 
create scenarios by arbitrarily varying the properties of the object on which the 
scenarios are centred and it can only successfully terminate if these scenarios all 
conform to NOP. However, the subject cannot recognize whether the scenarios it 
                                                        
39 See Vaidya, “Understanding and Essence,” 827–828. 
40 Husserl, Experience and Judgment, 342. 
41 Ibid. 
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creates conform to this success condition or whether they don’t. The success of an 
application of VIM therefore appears to be mostly a matter of luck, since the 
subject has to create scenarios without any means to verify that they do not 
undermine the successful completion of the process. This does not show that VIM 
cannot succeed, but it strongly suggests that it is, taking into account two plausible 
quality criteria, not a good method for acquiring objectual understanding of 
essence. 
5.2 The Contemporary View of Essence and the Apriority of VIM 
Vaidya aims to develop a general epistemology of essence which fits the 
contemporary view of essence of philosophers such as Fine and Lowe.42 Following 
Kripke,43 this view characteristically admits cases in which the essence of an entity 
is not discoverable by a priori means: The microstructure of a substance might for 
example be said to be essential to it, even though it is not discoverable by a priori 
means. More generally, the idea is that the two distinctions of it being imaginable 
or not that an object has a certain property and of it being essential or accidental to 
that object whether it has that property cut across each other. VIM faces a 
fundamental problem in accounting for knowledge of/understanding of an entity’s 
essence if we assume this contemporary view of essence. 
When describing the method of essential seeing, Husserl is clear that he 
assumes there to be a close connection between the thinkable and imaginable and 
the essential: “The essence proves to be that without which an object of a 
particular kind cannot be thought, i.e., without which the object cannot be 
intuitively imagined as such.”44 According to Husserl, “[w]e can direct our regard 
toward it[the essence] as toward the necessarily invariable, which prescribes limits 
to all variation practiced in the mode of the ‘arbitrary.’”45 With the contemporary 
notion of essence in mind, this quotation could be taken to give us a possible 
answer to our problem since one might understand it to say that while engaging in 
the imaginative activity required by VIM, the subject’s imagination is limited by 
the relevant essence.46 This limitation would then be what prevents the subject 
                                                        
42 See Vaidya, “Understanding and Essence,” 819. 
43 See Kripke, Naming and Necessity. 
44 Husserl, Experience and Judgment, 341. My emphasis. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Note that this contradicts the interpretation of Husserl developed in De Santis, 
“Phenomenological Kaleidoscope,” 31–33. Since my concern here is not with Husserl’s own view 
of the method, but rather with a view which adapts it to the notion of essence of contemporary 
metaphysicians, I will only remark that this interpretation would not help in solving the 
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from producing a variation in which the relevant object lacks one of its essential 
properties. One might hence say that there is a pre-established harmony between 
what we can imagine about an object of a certain kind and its corresponding kind-
essence. If we import this idea into the contemporary context, it amounts to what 
one may call essential rationalism:47 A philosopher who accepts it assumes that the 
imagination-based method of essential seeing gives us a priori access to essence. 
What VIM could hence offer a contemporary epistemologist of essence is a 
systematic method for probing which of an object’s properties we can subtract 
from it in our imagination and which we cannot, presupposing the essential 
rationalist view that what we can imagine about an object coincides with the 
possible states of the object left open by its essence. This presupposition however 
directly conflicts with the contemporary view that imaginability and essentiality 
come apart. The question of how to bridge this gap, or the corresponding gap 
between conceivability and metaphysical possibility, is of course one of the core 
questions in contemporary epistemology of modality.48 An answer to this question 
would be vital to Vaidya’s proposal and more generally to any epistemology of 
essence based on the Husserlian method of essential seeing. It is not surprising that 
Husserl himself49 provides no answer to this contemporary question, but we do not 
find it addressed in Vaidya’s paper either. What is clear however is that from a 
contemporary perspective, the view about the relation between the imaginable and 
the essential which one can extract from Husserl falls short of providing a 
satisfying answer. 
5.3 Conflation of Essence and de re Modality 
A further problem with the modified version of Vaidya’s proposal concerns the 
relation between the notions of essence and of metaphysical necessity, two notions 
which are clearly distinguished by contemporary essentialists.50 
Consider an instance of VIM. In it, the subject starts out with a particular 
experience or intuition of an object which is then subsequently modified by 
                                                                                                                      
problem at hand since it takes the subject who applies the method itself, not the relevant 
essence, to be the source of this limitation. 
47 Compare modal rationalism as e.g. characterized in Chalmers, “Does Conceivability Entail 
Possibility?” 172-173. 
48 See e.g. Chalmers, “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?” and Peter Kung, “Imagining as a 
Guide to Possibility,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81, 3 (2010): 620–663. 
49 Who holds that “essential truths are called a priori; this means, by reason of their validity, 
preceding all factuality, all determinations arising from experience.” (Husserl, Experience and 
Judgment, 352–353). 
50 I owe the main idea for this objection to Claudio Calosi and Fabrice Correia. 
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subtracting properties of the object to produce the plurality of variations which is 
then considered as a whole by the subject in order to see which properties remain 
constant throughout all of them. Both the subject’s starting point and the 
variations produced can be represented, without giving up on anything which is 
essential to the intended workings of VIM, in terms of either sets of propositions or 
facts involving the relevant object. Since possible worlds correspond to maximally 
consistent sets of propositions or facts, this means that we can think of them as 
corresponding to parts of possible worlds. This should immediately give us pause. 
Contemporary essentialists hold that essence is not definable in terms of 
necessity. The notion of metaphysical necessity (de re) can adequately be captured 
using possible worlds, but the notion of essence cannot be: Possible worlds are an 
adequate tool for capturing the metaphysically necessary properties of an object, 
but they cannot be used to capture the object’s essence, since there are some 
properties which some objects have with metaphysical necessity, even though they 
do not belong to these object’s essences: Socrates is necessarily distinct from the 
Eiffel Tower, but it is not essential to him that he is. This is of course the core 
insight of Fine’s influential objections to the modal definition of essence.51 
Since VIM can equivalently be restated as a method which relies only on 
possible worlds, this crucial difference means that there is in fact no good reason to 
think that the method can allow us to acquire (knowledge or) understanding of the 
essential, rather than of the necessary properties of an object. To put the point 
differently, from a contemporary perspective, essence is a hyperintensional notion, 
but Vaidya’s variant of the Husserlian method is only intensional in nature. What 
we are looking for is a foundational method for the epistemology of essence, but it 
turns out that we have no good reason to think that VIM gives us such a method, 
as opposed to a method for acquiring (knowledge or) understanding of 
metaphysical necessity (de re). 
6. Whither Essential Seeing and Objectual Understanding of Essence? 
Vaidya’s proposal combines two components which have been largely neglected in 
the contemporary discussions about the epistemologies of essence and of modality. 
The first is the Husserlian method of essential seeing, the second the idea of 
refocusing the debate on understanding instead of knowledge. The focus so far was 
on the combination of the two, but in this last section, I want to briefly comment 
on them separately in light of the previous discussion, starting with the Husserlian 
method/VIM. 
                                                        
51 See Fine, “Essence and Modality.” 
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It is important to note that the problems for VIM which were raised in the 
previous section arise no matter whether the method aims at understanding or at 
knowledge. Since I do not see any salient alternatives to these two proposals, I 
believe that VIM cannot play the central role in the epistemology of essence which 
Vaidya allocates to it. This role requires a method which permits a subject to 
acquire arbitrary bits of objectual understanding (or knowledge) of essence without 
having any previous epistemic access to essence, something which VIM does not 
deliver. 
That said, there still are two roles which it might be able to play. First, VIM 
appears to give us a viable method for determining, within certain limits, the 
essential properties of objects which belong to domains which are wholly 
accessible via our imagination and more generally via a priori methods. This may 
be the case for some geometrical objects, as Tieszen argues.52 
Second, VIM may give us a general systematic method for making tacit 
knowledge of essence explicit.53 It is plausible that freely varying the properties of 
an object may help us get clear on which of an object’s properties we assume to 
essentially belong to it. Assuming that we can acquire knowledge or understanding 
of essence in another way, VIM may thus help us realize which of our knowledge 
about an object concerns its essence. Another way in which the method may help 
us in this manner is as a device for inductively generalizing from knowledge or 
understanding of individual essences. A subject might for example apply VIM to 
different objects which share a certain essential property, noticing in each case that 
another property of these objects can likewise not coherently be subtracted when 
forming a new scenario. Based on this realization, the subject may inductively (and 
therefore defeasibly) infer that the two relevant properties are essentially 
connected with each other. This in turn may allow the subject to form the 
hypothesis that the second property is also essential to objects which have the first. 
Can Vaidya’s proposal to refocus the epistemology of essence on objectual 
understanding help solve problems faced by a knowledge-based epistemology? As I 
have stressed in the previous section, to have objectual understanding of an object’s 
essence, a subject still needs to have true beliefs about its essence. In this respect, 
any epistemology of essence which builds on the former instead of the latter 
notion will still have to answer the question of how we can reliably acquire true 
                                                        
52 See Richard Tieszen, “Free Variation and the Intuition of Geometric Essences: Some 
Reflections on Phenomenology and Modern Geometry,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 70, 1 (2005): 153–173. 
53 Thanks to Olivier Massin for this suggestion. An interpretation of Husserl’s own method 
which points in this direction is proposed in Kasmiers, “Defense of Husserl’s Method.” 
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beliefs about essence. So it seems that the move to objectual understanding does 
not really help us address the most pressing fundamental question in the 
epistemology of essence. This problem is magnified by the fact that objectual 
understanding, as Kvanvig and Vaidya understand it, is by design unsuitable to give 
us a reliable method, since it is compatible with epistemic luck. Perhaps other 
conceptions of objectual understanding could fare better in this respect, but this is 
a topic for another day.54 
                                                        
54 I would like to thank participants of sessions of the research colloquium at the Institute de 
philosophie of the University of Neuchâtel and of the eidos seminar at the University of Geneva. 
Special thanks to Claudio Calosi, Donnchadh O'Connail, Fabrice Correia, Arturs Logins, Olivier 
Massin, Kevin Mulligan, Maria Scarpati, Peter Simons, Jonas Waechter and three anonymous 
reviewers. The first steps towards writing this paper were made several years ago in a section of 
my phd thesis for which I received funding from the European Community's Seventh 
Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013 under grant agreement no. FP7-238128. Further work 
on the paper was made possible by the SNSF-funded project ‘Identity in Cognitive Science, 
Quantum Mechanics, and Metaphysics,’ grant number 185435, Università della Svizzera italiana, 
PI: Kevin Mulligan. 
